Telemt's Prometheus endpoint exposes only active-IP counts, while its loopback control API includes both the address list and sensitive proxy links. Add a root systemd timer that enters the Telemt container network namespace, filters the API response in memory, and publishes only username/address rows through the Zabbix agent key telemt.active_ips.list.\n\nThe collector refreshes every 30 seconds, writes atomically with root:zabbix 0640 permissions, and leaves the control API unexposed. Document the host installation and recommend one-day Zabbix history because client IP addresses are sensitive operational data.
Publish Telemt's container metrics port 9090 as 192.168.0.35:9092 because Cockpit already owns host port 9090. Bind the application listener to 0.0.0.0 inside the container and restrict Telemt's metrics whitelist to the client-02 Zabbix server at 192.168.0.34/32.\n\nDocument the Zabbix template macro URL and the Telemt 3.4.25 loopback-binding gotcha. The live endpoint returned HTTP 200 with 40,235 bytes from the Zabbix server; Telemt remained healthy and rebuilt its Telegram DC connections in six seconds.
alexbers/mtprotoproxy's Fake-TLS handshake was rejected by real Telegram
clients (server/clock/secret/egress all verified good), so replace it with
Telemt (ghcr.io/telemt/telemt:3.4.25) - the same proven implementation as the
Hetzner endpoint. Config: Fake-TLS on :1080, use_middle_proxy=false (direct-to-DC,
required with a SOCKS5 upstream) and [[upstreams]] socks5 ts-proxy:1055 so only
DC-bound traffic exits via the Tailscale exit node. Secret in host-only
telemt.toml; config.py.example (alexbers) removed. Telemt stays on json-file
(its tracing logs don't ship cleanly via the syslog driver).
Dashboard: retarget the working 3proxy queries from :1080 to the HTTP front
:3128 (the old HTTP section used stale tinyproxy patterns), drop the retired
SOCKS5 section, add a Telegram/Telemt info panel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Retire the generic SOCKS5 :1080 (raw SOCKS5 is blocked by TSPU/DPI for the
external Telegram use case) and add ts-lan-mtproto (alexbers/mtprotoproxy) on
:1080 instead: a Fake-TLS MTProto proxy whose Telegram-DC connections chain
through the Tailscale userspace SOCKS5 (SOCKS5_HOST=ts-proxy:1055), so egress
still rides the Hetzner exit node. Client-facing hop is domestic Fake-TLS to
test the hypothesis that TSPU bites hardest at the border. 3proxy keeps only
the HTTP front (:3128). The proxy secret lives in a host-only config.py
(0600, uid 10000, not in git); config.py.example is the secret-free template.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Retire the tinyproxy HTTP container (tinyproxy has no per-source-IP
conditional auth) and serve both the HTTP proxy (:3128) and SOCKS5 (:1080)
from a single 3proxy instance. LAN (192.168.0.0/22) stays passwordless;
any non-LAN source (i.e. external clients via the router port-forward) must
authenticate. Credentials live in a host-only /etc/3proxy/3proxy.secret
(0600, not in git), included by 3proxy.cfg. A deny rule on the gateway IP
makes the proxy fail closed if the port-forward ever SNATs to 192.168.0.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a LAN-facing SOCKS5 proxy alongside the existing tinyproxy HTTP proxy,
both egressing through the same Tailscale exit node.
- new service socks5 (ghcr.io/3proxy/3proxy): SOCKS5 on 192.168.0.35:1080,
auth iponly / allow 192.168.0.0/22, chained via `parent socks5 ts-proxy 1055`
to the Tailscale userspace SOCKS5, so clients exit as 89.167.72.79.
- 3proxy.cfg tracked here as source of truth; access log shipped to Loki via
the syslog log-driver (tag tailscale-socks5).
Verified: curl --socks5 / --socks5-hostname 192.168.0.35:1080 -> 89.167.72.79,
wikipedia 200. Carries TCP only (no QUIC/UDP), same as the HTTP front - README
updated to note this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New stack tailscale-proxy: a LAN HTTP proxy (192.168.0.35:3128) that egresses
through the dedicated Hetzner Tailscale exit node fedora-technohim, so proxied
LAN clients appear on the internet as 89.167.72.79 without routing the docker
host itself through the tunnel.
- ts-proxy: Tailscale in userspace mode (--exit-node=100.121.234.85), exposing a
SOCKS5 proxy on :1055. Userspace mode makes no host route/firewall changes.
- tinyproxy: LAN-facing forward proxy on :3128 (Allow 192.168.0.0/22), upstream
socks5 to ts-proxy. Access log shipped to Alloy/Loki via the syslog
log-driver (tag tailscale-proxy).
The Tailscale auth key stays outside Git in /mnt/containers/tailscale-proxy/
ts.env (0600); node state persists in the state/ dir. tinyproxy.conf is tracked
here as source of truth. See tailscale-proxy/README.md.
Also adds logging/grafana-dashboards/tailscale-proxy.json: a Loki dashboard
(request rate by method, top destinations, top clients, totals, live access
log) built from the tinyproxy syslog stream, matching the existing dashboards'
schemaVersion 39 + ${datasource} template-var pattern.
Full build record in ops-knowledge
diagnostics/2026-07-23-02-tekhnohim-docker-tailscale-exit-proxy-stack.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pipistrello
