tailscale-proxy: switch Telegram proxy to Telemt; rework Grafana dashboard
alexbers/mtprotoproxy's Fake-TLS handshake was rejected by real Telegram clients (server/clock/secret/egress all verified good), so replace it with Telemt (ghcr.io/telemt/telemt:3.4.25) - the same proven implementation as the Hetzner endpoint. Config: Fake-TLS on :1080, use_middle_proxy=false (direct-to-DC, required with a SOCKS5 upstream) and [[upstreams]] socks5 ts-proxy:1055 so only DC-bound traffic exits via the Tailscale exit node. Secret in host-only telemt.toml; config.py.example (alexbers) removed. Telemt stays on json-file (its tracing logs don't ship cleanly via the syslog driver). Dashboard: retarget the working 3proxy queries from :1080 to the HTTP front :3128 (the old HTTP section used stale tinyproxy patterns), drop the retired SOCKS5 section, add a Telegram/Telemt info panel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -36,21 +36,27 @@ services:
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tag: tailscale-proxy
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networks: [proxynet]
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# Telegram-only Fake-TLS MTProto proxy on :1080 (replaces the TSPU-blocked
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# generic SOCKS5). Chains its Telegram-DC connections through the Tailscale
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# userspace SOCKS5 (SOCKS5_HOST=ts-proxy:1055 in config.py) so egress still
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# rides the Hetzner exit node. Client-facing hop is domestic Fake-TLS; the
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# foreign leg is the WireGuard tunnel that already carries the HTTP proxy.
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# config.py is host-only (0600, uid 10000, NOT in git) - holds the secret.
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mtproto:
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image: alexbers/mtprotoproxy:latest
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container_name: ts-lan-mtproto
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# Telegram Fake-TLS MTProto proxy on :1080. Uses Telemt (the same proven
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# implementation as the Hetzner endpoint) after alexbers/mtprotoproxy's
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# Fake-TLS handshake was rejected by real clients (see the mtproto diagnostic).
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# Only DC-bound traffic is chained out through the Tailscale userspace SOCKS5
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# ([[upstreams]] socks5 ts-proxy:1055 in telemt.toml), so egress rides the
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# Hetzner exit node; the client-facing hop is direct Fake-TLS.
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# telemt.toml is host-only (0600, uid 65532/nonroot, NOT in git) - holds the secret.
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telemt:
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image: ghcr.io/telemt/telemt:3.4.25
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container_name: ts-lan-telemt
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restart: unless-stopped
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depends_on: [ts-proxy]
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environment:
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NO_COLOR: "1" # cleaner `docker logs` (no ANSI escapes)
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volumes:
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- "/mnt/containers/tailscale-proxy/mtproto/config.py:/home/tgproxy/config.py:ro,z"
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- "/mnt/containers/tailscale-proxy/telemt/telemt.toml:/app/config.toml:ro,z"
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ports:
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- "192.168.0.35:1080:1080"
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# Stays on json-file: telemt's tracing logs don't ship cleanly over the
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# syslog driver, and `docker logs ts-lan-telemt` is worth keeping for this
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# critical service. Observe it there (or wire its Prometheus metrics later).
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networks: [proxynet]
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networks:
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
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# alexbers/mtprotoproxy config for the tekhnohim Telegram Fake-TLS MTProto proxy.
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#
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# The REAL config.py is host-only at /mnt/containers/tailscale-proxy/mtproto/config.py
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# (mode 0600, owned by uid 10000 = the container's `tgproxy` user, NOT in git),
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# because USERS holds the proxy secret. This file is the secret-free template.
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#
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# Egress: SOCKS5_HOST/SOCKS5_PORT point at the Tailscale userspace SOCKS5
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# (ts-proxy:1055), so every Telegram-DC connection exits via the Hetzner exit
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# node (89.167.72.79). The client-facing side is Fake-TLS (looks like HTTPS to
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# TLS_DOMAIN), which survives TSPU where the retired raw SOCKS5 did not.
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PORT = 1080
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# username -> 32-hex-char secret (16 bytes). Generate: openssl rand -hex 16
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USERS = {
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"tekhnohim": "00000000000000000000000000000000",
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}
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# Fake-TLS only (best obfuscation). classic/secure are easier to fingerprint.
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MODES = {
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"classic": False,
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"secure": False,
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"tls": True,
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}
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# SNI presented in the Fake-TLS handshake. Must be a real, reachable HTTPS host.
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# Tunable if a given domain is filtered on the client path.
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TLS_DOMAIN = "www.google.com"
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# Upstream SOCKS5 = the Tailscale userspace proxy -> Hetzner exit node.
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SOCKS5_HOST = "ts-proxy"
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SOCKS5_PORT = 1055
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SOCKS5_USER = None
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SOCKS5_PASS = None
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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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# Telemt config for the tekhnohim Telegram Fake-TLS MTProto proxy (docker host).
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#
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# The REAL telemt.toml is host-only at
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# /mnt/containers/tailscale-proxy/telemt/telemt.toml (mode 0600, owned by the
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# image's nonroot uid 65532, NOT in git) because [access.users] holds the
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# proxy secret. This is the secret-free template.
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#
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# Egress: [[upstreams]] socks5 -> ts-proxy:1055 (Tailscale userspace SOCKS5),
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# so ONLY Telegram-DC traffic exits via the Hetzner exit node (89.167.72.79).
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# The client-facing side is direct Fake-TLS on :1080.
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# Direct-to-DC mode: with a SOCKS5 upstream, only DC-bound traffic is chained,
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# so use_middle_proxy MUST be false (middle-proxy/ME servers are not routed
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# through the upstream and fail to init behind the Tailscale SOCKS5).
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[general]
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use_middle_proxy = false
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[general.modes]
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classic = false
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secure = false
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tls = true # ee / FakeTLS
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[server]
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port = 1080
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[censorship]
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tls_domain = "www.google.com" # SNI presented in the Fake-TLS handshake; tunable
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[access.users]
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# username = 32-hex-char secret (16 bytes). Generate: openssl rand -hex 16
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tekhnohim = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
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# Chain Telegram-DC connections out through the Tailscale userspace SOCKS5.
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[[upstreams]]
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type = "socks5"
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address = "ts-proxy:1055"
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weight = 1
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enabled = true
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